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Hill: Some Realism about Facial Invalidation of Statutes

SOME REALISM ABOUT FACIAL
INVALIDATION OF STATUTES
Alfred Hill*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Roe v. Wade,' the United States Supreme Court invalidated the
Texas abortion statute in its entirety even though the statute was not
invalid in all its applications. The dissenters contended that, in the
circumstances, the statute should have been invalidated only as applied.2
A question to be considered here is whether an as-applied disposition
would have been disadvantageous to other women seeking abortions.
That this indeed would have been the result is widely believed. It will be
argued that this view is unfounded.
3
This Article will further consider whether, as has been claimed,
Roe is representative of an increasing practice on the part of the Supreme
Court to invalidate in their entirety statutes having both valid and invalid
components (hereinafter called hybrid statutes). Some Supreme Court
justices have vigorously opposed such a development, and there has
been much confusion on the subject.4 It is submitted that, when one
looks behind the rhetoric and examines the actual holdings, it becomes
apparent that nothing is really happening. The traditional rule of facial

* Simon H. Rifkind Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia Law School. Marvin Chirelstein
and Michael Dorf commented helpfully on an earlier draft.
1. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See id. at 177-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying
notes 80-81.
3. See infra Part V.
4. Various justices, never speaking for a majority, have repeatedly clashed on the point. See,
e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); id.
at 78-80, 79 n.2 (Sealia, J., dissenting) (discussing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987)); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment); Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (denial of certiorari); id. at
1178 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012-13 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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invalidation remains undisturbed. Under this rule, only the invalid
components of a hybrid statute have been subject to facial invalidation.
If the Court is now invalidating such statutes in their entirety, the
question is whether such a practice is meaningful. It will be argued that
persons whose conduct is constitutionally protected do not need it, and
that persons whose conduct is not so protected gain nothing from it.
These issues require consideration of some basic principles of
constitutional adjudication that seem to have been forgotten in the
current debate. In large part, examination of these principles will be the
burden of this Article.
Third-party standing is similar to the supposed cases of total
invalidation insofar as, in both situations, the question is whether
persons who are not themselves constitutionally protected may profit
from the constitutional rights of others. It will be shown that third-party
standing is distinctive in that it is predicated on a need to prevent
constitutional detriment to others.
Finally, consideration will be given to the views of academic
commentators. The writings here examined reveal a widespread
assumption that a statute containing valid and invalid components is
invalid in its entirety. This is contrary to repeated declarations by the
Court and is inconsistent with the Court's practice. The commentators
have attempted to rationalize these differences, but unsuccessfully, as
this Author will attempt to show.
Part II of the Article consists of an analysis of the general principles
that have traditionally guided the Court in facial invalidation. Part III
will contend that the Court has not departed from these principles. Part
IV will examine third-party standing. Part V will examine the theories of
academic commentators.
II. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF FACIAL INVALIDATION
A.

Terminology

A person charged with violation of a statute has had the choice of
one or both of two substantive defenses: (1)that the statute is
unconstitutional as written; and (2)that the conduct involved is not
constitutionally punishable. Thus, it could be contended that a statute
outlawing obscenity is so worded as to embrace protected expression. It
could also be contended that, even if the statute is properly worded, the
expression sought to be punished is, in fact, constitutionally protected or
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otherwise beyond the reach of the statute.5 The claim that the statute is
unconstitutional as written has been termed an attack on the face of the
statute. 6 The claim that, irrespective of whether the statute is defective as
written, the conduct involved is not punishable, has been termed an
attack on the constitutionality of the statute as applied.7
Traditionally, the term "as applied" has been used in an additional
sense, unrelated to whether the statutory violation was punishable. All
holdings of facial invalidation were understood to apply only to the
successful litigant; as a technical matter, the statute was deemed not
invalid as applied to others, although that might have been the practical
effect.8

5. Thus, the statute may be without force because the legislature lacks authority to adopt it.
Cases of this character have not surfaced in the area under discussion.
6. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 659 (1984) (plurality opinion) (assessing the
constitutionality of statutory limitations on color reproductions of currency in a magazine).
7. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 403-04 (1989) (assessing constitutionality of
regulation, both facially and as applied, regarding publications received by prison inmates). Though
facial invalidation involves striking down the statute as written, this does not, or should not, mean
that the statute is examined in a vacuum, divorced from consideration of facts pertinent to its
meaning or constitutional effect. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court invalidated
a statute establishing maximum hours for bakers on the basis of the Court's unsupported conclusion
that such a measure was unrelated to health. See id. at 64. Three years later, in Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908), the Court unanimously upheld a statute limiting the working hours of women.
See id. at 422-23. In determining that this statute bore substantially on the health of women, the
Court acknowledged benefit from a "very copious collection" of data in a "brief filed by Mr. Louis
D. Brandeis." Id. at 419 & n. 1. This, of course, is what we call judicial notice, and it is practiced on
every judicial level. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 201(b) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.").
Facts may be introduced for the purpose of showing that a statute is invalid as written, or
for the purpose of showing that it is invalid as applied, or for both purposes. These distinctions are
sometimes overlooked, as happened in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). There, the
plaintiffs attacked a federal statute on its face, and as applied, on the ground that it tended to create
excessive entanglement of government with religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause. See
id. at 593. The plaintiff offered evidence of governmental grants under the statute as evidence of
such a tendency, and the Court held that this evidence was pertinent only to the as-applied aspect of
the case. See id. at 620-21. But suppose that statutes identical to the one before the Court had been
in effect in a number of states, and that similar evidence had been adduced to show the operation of
those statutes. The Court would have been willfully blind if it had refused to consider the bearing of
this kind of evidence on the facial validity of the statute before it. That the same evidence also bore
on the as-applied aspect of the case did not make it irrelevant to whether the statute was valid as
written.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 47-49.
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B. FacialInvalidationof Partof a Statute
The Court has observed that "[a] statute may be [facially] invalid as
applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another." 9 The
Court has long invalidated parts of a statute,' and, as a matter of course,
has said that the particular part was being facially invalidated."
C. Raines: The General Rule
2
In United States v. Raines,1
the United States sought to enjoin state
election officials from discriminating against voters on the basis of race.
The Court rejected an argument that the statute should be invalidated on
the ground that it was worded so broadly as to outlaw discrimination by
private persons as well as government personnel. The defendant officers
were said to have standing to complain of the statute only insofar as it
bore on their own conduct. The reason the Court gave was as follows:

This Court, as is the case with all federal courts, "has no jurisdiction to
pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void,
because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon
to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the
exercise of that jurisdiction, it is bound by two rules, to which it has
rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to
formulate a rule ...broader than is required by the precise facts to

which it is to be applied." Kindred to these rules is the rule that one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons 3or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional.

9. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921); see also Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 115-16 (1934) (stating that the rule of Dahnke-Walker as applied to
legislation "is even more plainly true of the action of judicial or administrative officers dealing only
with the instance"); DuPont v. Comm'r, 289 U.S. 685, 688 (1933) (citing Dahnke-Walker to justify
disparate decisions on similar sets of facts).
10. See, e.g., Thomburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 750,
768-69, 771-72 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 882-83 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Souter & Kennedy, JJ.); Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908).
11. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) ("We conclude that the display clause
of [the statute at issue] is unconstitutional on its face."); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 36970 (1931) ("The first clause of the statute [is] invalid upon its face ....
12. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
13. Id. at 21 (citations omitted); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).
In Broadrick, the Court stated:
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In Raines, the challenge was to a single statutory provision that was
susceptible to both valid and (assumedly) invalid applications; by its
terms the statute applied to discriminatory conduct by any person.' 4 The
reasoning of the Court applies equally when the valid and invalid
features of a statute are embodied in separate provisions.'" References
hereafter to valid and invalid provisions of a statute should be
understood to embrace also a single provision susceptible to both valid
and invalid applications.
D. Salerno
When facial invalidation is appropriate, the governing rule was
stated as follows in UnitedStates v. Salerno:6
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must

establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is
insufficient to render it wholly invalid .... '7
This passage, which has been quoted many times since,'8 makes
eminent sense. Claimants contending that a statute is facially invalid are,
in effect, contending that the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to
them, no matter what they did. Also, it should be noted that, while the
quoted passage refers only to statutes, there is no plausible reason why

Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle
that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally
to others, in other situations not before the Court.
Id.
14. See Rahzes, 362 U.S. at 23, 25.
15. See, e.g., id. at 23 (finding that it would be only in "that rarest of cases" where "Congress
would not have desired its legislation to stand at all unless it could validly stand in its every
application"); Adair, 208 U.S. at 180 (noting that an unconstitutional provision of a statute was
"severable from its other parts"); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges
and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1321, 1334 (2000) [hereinafter Fallon, Facial
Challenges]; Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 ANI. U. L. REV. 359, 387 n.129 (1998).
16. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
17. Id. at 745. While no authorities were cited for this point, the Court had earlier employed
similar language. See, e.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
796 (1984); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95
(1982).
18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143, 155 n.6 (1995); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292,301 (1993).
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the no-valid-application rule should not also govern when part of a
statute is under constitutional attack.' 9
E. The Anomaly of FacialInvalidation
Since facial invalidation turns on whether any valid applications of
the statute are possible, how often can a court be confident that its guess
is right, and what happens if it is wrong? Thus, in a recent study of
statutory vagueness, this Author concluded that a statute vague in all
possible applications is a rarity.20 On the other hand, clarity in the law
may be deceptive. Even the simple type of anti-abortion statute involved
in Roe v. Wade was susceptible to valid applications.2 ' Furthermore,
there are undoubtedly a substantial number of cases in which a court
simply overlooks the Raines limitation and declares a statute or statutory
provision to be facially void despite the possibility of valid applications.
attributable to a wrong
What is the effect of such holdings, whether
22
guess or inattention to the governing rule?

F. The Self-CorrectingMechanism of the Law
Shortly after invalidation of the Texas abortion statute in Roe v.
Wade, a Connecticut statute that was substantially similar was applied to
punish the performance of an abortion by a person who was not a
physician.2 Observing that the Supreme Court had stated in Roe that the
Texas statute was being invalidated in its entirety,24 the highest court of

19. This point has been made in Fallon, Facial Challenges, supra note 15, at 1334-35;
Isserles, supra note 15, at 369 n.34, 387 n.129. However, Isserles also says that Salerno requires of
the claimant "a Herculean ... demonstration that each and every application of the statute would be
unconstitutional." Id. at 383. A sensible judge would not put the claimant to such a task, and would
be skeptical of any purported "demonstration" as proof. See id. If a claimant makes a no-validapplication assertion that is not patently implausible, the defendant can be asked to rebut it by
showing that a single valid application is possible. See id.
20. See Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog,
51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1289, 1295 (1999) [hereinafter Hill, PoliceDiscretion].
21. See discussion infra Part lI.G.
22. Is this problem avoidable? A drastic solution would be to eliminate facial invalidation
altogether, and allow constitutional attack only by claimants who can show that their conduct is not
punishable. In effect, what the statute says would become immaterial in such cases. Among other
things this would eliminate the need for notice of what the law condemns. The result might be
called a totalitarian ideal: Whatever is not permitted is forbidden.
23. See State v. Menillo, 362 A.2d 962, 962-63 (Conn.) (per curiam), vacated by 423 U.S. 9
(1975) (per curiam).
24. What the Supreme Court said on this point is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 79-87.
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the state held that Roe required invalidation of the Connecticut statute.2
In Connecticut v. Menillo, the Supreme Court reversed the Connecticut
decision in a per curiam opinion.' The Court said:
In Roe we held that Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1196, which permitted
termination of pregnancy at any stage only to save the life of the
expectant mother, unconstitutionally restricted a woman's right to an
abortion. We went on to state that as a result of the unconstitutionality
of Art. 1196 ... the Texas abortion statutes had to fall "as a unit," and
it is that statement which the Connecticut Supreme Court and courts in
some other States have read to require the invalidation of their own
statutes even as applied to abortions performed by nonphysicians. In
context, however, our statement had no such effect. Jane Roe had
sought to have an abortion "'performed by a competent, licensed
physician, under safe, clinical conditions,"' and our opinion recognized
only her right to an abortion under those circumstances. That the
Texas statutes fell as a unit meant only that they could not be enforced,
with or without Art. 1196, in contravention of a woman's right to a
clinical abortion by medically competent personnel. We did not hold
the Texas statutes unenforceable against a nonphysician abortionist, for
the case did not presentthe issue.27

It is easy to guess why the Court decided the case summarily,
without opportunity for argument. No rule is better settled than that the
force of a decision, whether as stare decisis or precedent, operates only
with respect to matters in issue and actually decided5 The force of a
judgment, in terms of issue preclusion, is similarly limited.29 Besides, a
judgment qua judgment is normally operative only as between the
immediate parties? ° These rules dispose of the problem of excessively
broad facial invalidations, apart from the effect of an unduly broad
judgment on the invalidated statute itself.
G. The Effect of the Unduly Broad Judgment on the InvalidatedStatute
There is a common perception that unqualified judicial invalidation
of a statute terminates the life of that statute, with the result that the
jurisdiction may pursue its legitimate interests only by adoption of
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Menillo, 362 A.2d at 963.
See Menillo, 423 U.S. at 9.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 27 cmt. e (1982)

[hereinafter

RESTATEMENT].

29. See id.
30. See id. § 27 cmt. a.
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another statute. 3' This indeed may be the rule of a particular jurisdiction,
32
but it is not a rule required by the Constitution of the United States.
Suppose that after the decision in Connecticut v. Menillo, the state
of Texas, invoking the very statute held by the Supreme Court to be
unconstitutional in toto in Roe v. Wade, prosecutes an abortionist who is
not a physician. To objection that the statute is no longer in effect, the
Texas Supreme Court rules that, as a matter of Texas law, the statute is
still in force as applied to nonphysician abortionists. On what possible
ground can this defendant succeed in the Supreme Court? The law of a
state is what its courts declare it to be. And the judgment in Roe v. Wade
has no effect qua judgment in a prosecution against a different
defendant.
Or, suppose that the United States Supreme Court invalidates a
state statute on the ground that the state legislature exceeded its power
under the state constitution. 33 The highest court of the state subsequently
holds that the Supreme Court erred, and that the statute is still in effect.
As to whether the earlier federal judgment terminated the existence of
the state statute, consider what the Supreme Court has said respecting a
federal statute:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the
ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered
only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or
threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an
act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the
law applicable to the controversy. It amounts to little more than the
negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which
otherwise would stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal
right.... If a case for preventive relief be presented the court enjoins,
in effect, not the execution of the statute, but the acts of the official, the
statute notwithstanding.3

31. This view prevailed in the nineteenth century. Thus, the Supreme Court said: "An
unconstitutional act is not a law; ... it is, in legal contemplation .... as though it had never been
passed." Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). On the erosion of this view, see
Lemon v. Kurtznan, 411 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1973) (plurality opinion), and Chicot County Drainage
Districtv. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940). Cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-06
(1989) (plurality opinion) (habeas corpus context).
32. See Fallon, FacialChallenges, supranote 15, at 1339-40.
33. It may be assumed that the case arose in a federal district court, so that remand to the state
courts is not an option.
34. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,488 (1923).
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H. The Exceptions
To the foregoing general principles, the Court has recognized two
exceptions. One of these consists of thejus tertii cases,35 and the other is
the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. These exceptions are
discussed below.
III. THE CHALLENGE TO TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE: FACIAL
INVALIDATION AS TOTAL INVALIDATION

A. In General
The view has taken hold that the Court does not confine itself to
facial invalidation in accordance with the traditional limitations
heretofore described. Some Justices and academic commentators have
contended that, apart from the two exceptions just noted, the Court in
fact does invalidate a statute in its entirety even though valid as well as
invalid applications are possible.37 Indeed, to most such persons, a
declaration of facial invalidity has come to signify total invalidation.38
This understanding derives in part from their understanding of',
United States v. Salerno, where the Court said that a statute is not
facially invalid unless invalid in all possible applications.3 ' As
previously noted, this makes eminent sense, since litigants urging facial
invalidation are claiming that the statutory language cannot validly be
applied to them no matter what they did. But the provision thus
challenged may constitute only part of a statute (or a particular
application), as distinct from the statute as a whole. The Salerno
formulation is obviously pertinent in both instances. Prior to Salerno, the
Court struck down parts of statutes, and was explicit in calling this facial
35. See discussion infra Part IV.
36. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.

37. See discussion infra Part V.
38. As noted earlier, traditionally facial invalidation meant no more than invalidation of
statutory language as applied to the claimant (or, more precisely, to the circumstances of the
claimant). With this traditional terminology apparently forgotten, the term "facial invalidation" has
come to be used only with regard to invalidation of a statute in its entirety, despite the presence of
valid components. The term "as applied" is now used in regard to invalidation of a statute only in its
application to the claimant. Current usage is illustrated by Justice Scalia's recent suggestion that
"facial invalidation" be abandoned altogether. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74
(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He would confine invalidation of a statute to "its particular
application to the party in suit." Id. To avoid confusion on this point, this Article will continue to
employ traditional usage. Facial invalidation, in the sense newly conferred upon it, will be referred
to as "total invalidation."
39. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,745 (1987).
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invalidation.'" There is no warrant for reading Salerno as a ruling that
facial invalidation has different meanings or consequences depending on
whether the provision struck down is an entire statute or part of a statute.
Reliance is also placed on decisions said to show that the Court is
indeed striking down in toto statutes having both valid and invalid
provisions.4 One class of these cases is about to be discussed, and it will
be argued that they have been misconstrued. In the other cases, the Court
unqualifiedly invalidates statutes even when the possibility of valid
applications, although apparent to the particular reader, is not mentioned
by the Court, presumably because the Court reads the statute differently,
or thinks the point irrelevant, or does not think about the point at all.4 In
any event, what is common to these cases is that whether the statute
should be invalidated as to possibly valid applications appears never to
be in issue.
The proponents of facial invalidation as total invalidation see it as
desirable in that it saves nonparties in the position of the plaintiff from
the need to engage in "case-by-case" pursuit of their rights, a need which
is assumed would exist if the statute were invalidated only as applied.4
This is patently untrue. Suppose that, in Roe v. Wade, the Court had
declared expressly that the Texas abortion statute was being invalidated
only as applied to Roe. On the basis of stare decisis, other women would
have gained from the decision as much as Roe did. Invalidation of the
statute in toto, which is what the Court purported to do, did not gain
them more. As nonparties, they got nothing from the judgment.
Their
44
only benefit from the decision was its effect as stare decisis.

40. See supranotes 10-11 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("I therefore agree with the Court that on the record before us ... the Delaware statute is
unconstitutional on its face. How the Court's opinion may be applied in other contexts is not
entirely clear to me."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (noting that the Texas statute under
consideration is unconstitutional because it "sweeps too broadly" and "makes no distinction"
between abortions at different times during pregnancy or for different reasons); Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) ("A State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard.... without questioning the power of a State to impose reasonable residence
restrictions on the availability of the ballot."); see also Michael C. Dorf, FacialChallenges to State
and FederalStatutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 282 n.214 (1994).
43. See Dorf, supra note 42, at 236, 270-71; Fallon, Facial Challenges, supra note 15,
at 1352.
44. A decision that may otherwise be a mere precedent has stare decisis effect insofar as it is
binding upon inferior courts in the judicial hierarchy. Thus, decisions of the Supreme Court are
stare decisis as to every court in the land. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
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Of course, if the government should renew enforcement efforts
without regard to the effect of an invalidating decision, resolution of the
issue of stare decisis on a case-by-case basis would be necessary.
Typically, the government does not attempt to flout the invalidating
decision; instead, it seeks enforcement of the statute as to matters it
claims are outside the scope of the decision. An obvious example is the
prosecution of the nonphysician abortionist.4 As a practical matter, it is
in cases like these that the burden of case-by-case testing of the statute
arises, and this is unavoidable.
Assuming total invalidation to have any meaningful effect, it is
only in regard to persons whose conduct is not constitutionally
protected, since the provisions applicable to them would have been
invalidated along with the rest of the statute. How the public interest
would be served by placing such persons beyond the reach of the law is
a question not considered by the judicial or academic proponents of total
invalidation. But the question is moot anyway, for the reason that
judicial decisions and judgments are without binding effect as to issues
not actually passed upon. 46 If such provisions were passed upon, the case
would be different from the type under consideration, for if they were
invalidated this was not the consequence of total invalidation as such,
and if they were validated this would not be a case of total invalidation.
Thus, facial invalidation as total invalidation adds nothing to the
rights of persons whose conduct is constitutionally protected, and is
without legal effect as to persons whose conduct is not constitutionally
protected.
These conclusions follow from the principles of constitutional
adjudication discussed in Part II of this Article. Of course, these
principles, having been devised by the Court, can be modified by the
Court. The question is whether they have been modified by the decisions
about to be discussed. These decisions, upon which the proponents of
facial (total) invalidation particularly rely, are distinctive in that the
Court is aware that it is dealing with a hybrid statute. It is submitted that
they mark no change in the law.
B. The CriticalCases
We come now to the cases said to show total invalidation of a
statute containing both valid and invalid parts. One class of these cases
may be disposed of at the outset. In these cases, the Court does indeed
45. See supratext accompanying notes 23-30.
46. See supranotes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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unqualifiedly invalidate statutes, although the possibility of valid
applications is not mentioned by the Court. 47 As has been seen, except as
to matters actually decided, a broad invalidation that seemingly
encompasses such matters is without effect as stare decisis, and the
judgment is similarly without effect. 8 Those who rely on these decisions
show no awareness of these limitations. 49
The only cases that are relevant are those in which the Court
confronts the issue of whether a hybrid statute should be invalidated in
its entirety. Proponents of such invalidation have cited a number of cases
thought to have been decided on this basis,s° but it is submitted that these
cases show no departure from traditional principles. They will now be
discussed seriatim.
1. Casey: Prophylactic Rules
From time to time, the Supreme Court has promulgated
prophylactic rules.5 ' Thus, a penal statute is void if it creates a potential
for discriminatory or arbitrary conduct by police officers.52 That a
particular arrest was free from such taint is immaterial. No arrest can be
justified under the statute. Another example of prophylaxis is the
requirement of content-neutrality in statutes imposing limitations on
speech.5 ' Again, it is immaterial that in the particular case the speech was
outside the protection of the First Amendment. Such decisions are not
inconsistent with the Salerno principle that facial invalidation is
appropriate only when no valid applications of the statute are possible. 4
From its nature, a prophylactic rule admits of no exceptions: A statutory
provision violative of such a rule is necessarily invalid in all possible
applications.55
A prophylactic rule was involved in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,56 the case most heavily relied on by those who maintain that the
Supreme Court is invalidating hybrid statutes in their entirety. 7 There,
the pertinent statute required a woman tQ notify her husband before
47.
48.
49.
50.

See sources cited supranote 42 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
See infra note 70 and accompanying text.

51.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 1234.

52. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 361 (1983).
53. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385-86 (1992).
54. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
55.

See Dorf, supranote 42, at 277-78.

56.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

57.

See, e.g., Doff, supra note 42, at 275-76; Fallon, Facial Challenges, supra note 15, at

1355-56.
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undergoing an abortion." The plurality opinion mentioned the findings
in the courts below that the great majority of women do notify their
husbands, but that notification in all cases, especially when there is
already marital discord, would often result in severe physical and
psychological abuse of the wife. 9 On this basis, the plurality justices
invalidated the notification requirement as "likely to prevent a
significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. ' 6° This was
seemingly contrary to the no-valid-application rule of Salerno, since it
was clear that in a large number of cases the requirement would work no
harm. But the holding is distinguishable from Salerno. For, in striking
down the requirement, the plurality in effect ruled that, as a
constitutional matter, avoiding undue burden on a woman's abortion
decision required adoption of a prophylactic rule on the subject. If the
Court had followed Salerno, it would have invalidated the statute only as
to women apprehensive that notifying their husbands would subject
them to severe physical and psychological abuse, and would have left
the statute standing as to all other women. Two classes of women would
have been created, with many of them uncertain as to which class they
belonged to and afraid to find out.61 It was apparent that a substantial
number of wives might forego abortions altogether if notification of the
husband were required.
The meaning of Casey perhaps becomes clearer if we consider the
earlier decision in Ohio v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health.62 In
this abortion case, the Court upheld a parent-notification requirement
that was accompanied by a judicial bypass procedure setting time limits
in order to ensure prompt judicial action. 6 The claimants argued that in
some situations there could be excessive delay despite compliance with
the time limits. 4 But the Court found, justifiably in the circumstances,65

58. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
59. See id. at 892-93.
60. Id. at 893.
61. This, of course, is also suggestive of constitutional vagueness. Probably a number of
prophylactic rules can be rationalized as rules against vagueness. Certainly this is true of the rule
that the law governing police enforcement activity must not create a potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory practices. See Hill, PoliceDiscretion,supranote 20, at 1302-07. But prophylaxis has
a distinctive connotation. A statute may be invalidated for sound reasons of prophylaxis even
though it is not in the least vague. See, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18-19 (1928).
62. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
63. See id. at 507-09.
64. See id. at 513-14.
65. In finding that the time limits were unreasonably long, the courts below had construed the
statutory reference to "days" (improperly, as the Supreme Court concluded) as business days, and
then assumed that the judicial proceeding might be filed "at a time during the year in which the 14
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that such situations would rarely, if ever, arise, and refused to invalidate
the parent-notification provision on the basis of a "worst-case analysis
that may never occur." 66 Akron stands for the sensible proposition that a
prophylactic rule need not be perfect. 67
Confusion over the meaning of Casey has resulted in large part
from the following statement in the opinion: "[I]n a large fraction of the
cases in which [the husband-notification requirement] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice
to undergo an
6
abortion. It is an undue burden, and therefore invalid."
Wrenching this statement from its context, judges69 and scholars70
have taken it to mean generally that a statute invalid in a "large fraction"
of applications is subject to invalidation in its entirety.' On this basis,
Casey has been interpreted as a repudiation of Salerno.72 It is submitted
business days needed for the bypass procedure would encompass 3 Saturdays, 3 Sundays, and 2
legal holidays." Id. at 513.
66. Id. at 514.
67. Validation of the parent-notification provision did not preclude relief in the rare case
where it could be shown that the time limitations were inadequate. See id. In such a situation, it
could be argued that the provision was unconstitutional as applied in the circumstances of the case.
68. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
69. Judges have generally understood Casey to be inconsistent with Salerno, and have been
confused as to whether it overrules Salerno, or announces a competing rule applicable in some cases
but not others. The confusion has been especially pronounced in abortion cases. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently noted that its own "jurisprudence on this question is
not a model of clarity," Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999), with one panel
holding that Casey did not overrule Salerno and another panel seemingly holding the contrary.
See id.
The impact of Casey also has been felt outside the abortion area. A state statute
establishing a central register for reports of child abuse was invalidated because the court, citing
Casey, concluded that the statute would operate unconstitutionally in a "large fraction" of cases. See
State v. Jackson, 496 S.E.2d 912, 916 (Ga. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit, in several cases involving
First Amendment challenges to state statutes, has first considered whether it was Salerno or Casey
that should be applied, and then disposed of the case on other grounds. See, e.g., United States v.
Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1235-36, 1235 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000); Fla. League of Prof'l Lobbyists, Inc.
v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 459 (11 th Cir. 1996).
70. See Dorf, supra note 42, at 276; Fallon, Facial Challenges, supra note 15, at 1356; John
Christopher Ford, Note, The Casey Standardfor Evaluating FacialAttacks on Abortion Statutes,
95 MICH. L. REv. 1443, 1451-54 (1997); Isserles, supranote 15, at 458-59, 461.
71. Judicial and academic comment is notable for its inattention to why persons not within the
"fraction" should be placed beyond the reach of the law. Abortion statutes do present a special
problem, but it is not one pertaining to so-called facial invalidation. Rather, the problem is one
calling for exemption from the normal rule that a litigant may not assert the constitutional rights of
others. See discussion infra Part IV. The women affected by such statutes are often poor, sometimes
frightened, and always subject to severe time constraints. What they need is a regime under which
others may assert their rights. And that they have had since almost immediately after the decision in
Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-15 (1976) (plurality opinion); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
72. See, e.g., Ford, supranote 70, at 1445-46.
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that such an interpretation of Casey is unwarranted. It is unreasonable to
read this language as making so basic a change in the law. Taken in
context, the language has a much narrower meaning. Like other rules, a
prophylactic rule has its reasons. If only an insignificant number of
wives were adversely affected by the husband-notification requirement,
there would have been no need for a prophylactic rule. This, indeed, is
the rationale of Akron. In context, the determination in Casey that a
"large fraction" of women were adversely affected was the justification

for adoption of a prophylactic rule.74 But only the plurality opinion of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter took this position. 75 Justices
Stevens and Blackmun, finding no vagueness, were in favor of
invalidation on the ground that the statutory language created a potential

73. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (noting that the Ohio parental notification statute "does not impose an undue, or otherwise
unconstitutional, burden on a minor seeking an abortion" and that the state could validly assume
that "in most instances" the family will support her).
74. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992). A number of other cases
relied on by academic commentators have similarly involved prophylaxis. United States v. Edge
BroadcastingCo., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), involved a federal statute regulating lottery advertising by
broadcasters. See id. at 421. The Court likened the statute to one setting a time, place, or manner
restriction on speech, or one curbing solicitation by lawyers. See id. at 430-3 1. Such measures were
said to be "prophylactic" by nature, not avoidable by a showing that conduct was unobjectionable in
the particular case. See id. at 431. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928), involved a New Jersey
statute providing that, in a negligence action against an out-of-state motorist, service could be made
on the secretary of state. See id. at 15, 17-18. Although in this instance there was actual notice to the
defendant, the Court invalidated the statute for failure to contain a provision "making it reasonably
probable" that notice would be communicated. See id. at 15-16, 18-19. Lack of such a provision,
said the Court, "leaves open... a clear opportunity for the commission of fraud." Id. at 19. R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul,505 U.S. 377 (1992), insofar as here relevant, illustrates the rule that, if a statute
affecting expression is not content-neutral, it must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest. See id. at 395. In effect, prophylaxis was needed because of a failure to narrow the statute
sufficiently. In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), a facial attack was made on a federal
statute for violating the Establishment Clause. See id. at 593. In defense, the government argued that
the statute was valid in at least some applications. See id. at 627 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But
the Court rejected this approach, instead measuring the statute against the three factors announced in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602. In Lemon, the Court had
said its concern was with "the potential for impermissible fostering of religion.' Lemon, 403 U.S. at
619. Such a concern is, by its nature, prophylactic. Cf. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497
U.S. 502, 521 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
the Ohio parental notification statute provides the judicial bypass option for those "exceptional
situations in which [parental] notice will cause a realistic risk of... harm"); see also Fallon, Facial
Challenges, supra note 15, at 1336 (citing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), as
facially invalidating a statute for vagueness even though it was not vague in all applications).
75. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
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for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement activity by the State.7 6 The
O'Connor plurality took this view as well.77
Finally, although the Casey decision has been characterized as one
of total invalidation, it should be emphasized that the Court invalidated
only that part of the statute requiring husband notification, leaving the
rest of the statute standing. 78 Both with regard to the statute as a whole or
a controverted part, total invalidation is improper-and, indeed, without
effect-as to such applications of the statutory language that the Court
did not pass upon.
2. Roe v. Wade
In this case, the Court made clear that late-term abortions could be
banned if not undertaken to preserve the life or health of the mother.79
Moreover, the record did not disclose the claimant's stage of pregnancy
when she initiated her suit for judicial relief.0 Justice Rehnquist argued
in his dissent that, in these circumstances, the Court was not justified in
striking down the statute in its entirety rather than as applied.8' Thus, the
issue of total invalidation in such circumstances was squarely before the
Court.
The Court's reply to Justice Rehnquist, if it was indeed intended as
a reply, was unresponsive. First, it should be noted that the anti-abortion
provisions appeared in the Texas penal code.8 2 Articles 1191-1194 of the
code outlawed abortions and dealt with attempts and related matters."
Article 1196 provided, in effect, that nothing in the previous articles
applied when an abortion was performed under "medical advice for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother." 84 The statute was invalidated in
its entirety, the Court declaring as follows:
Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional means, of course, that
the Texas abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall. The exception [sic] of
Art. 1196 cannot be struck down separately, for then the State would
76. See id. at 916-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 933-34
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part).
77. See id. at 877 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
78. See id. at 844, 879, 898, 901 (holding that, of the five provisions of the Pennsylvania
abortion statute at issue, only the "husband notification requirement" and a related subsection of the
reporting requirements were unconstitutional).
79. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
80. See id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 177-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 1191-96 (Vernon 1948); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
at 117 n.l.
83. See TEx. PENAL CODE arts. 1191-94.
84. Id. art. 1196.
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be left with a statute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how

medically urgent the case.s5
Thus, the Court was saying that no part of this statute could survive
invalidation of one of its provisions because of the way the statute was
written. Nothing the Court said can be understood as intimating that a
statute is invalid in all applications solely because it is invalid in some.
Any doubt about this aspect of Roe v. Wade is dispelled by its decision
shortly afterward in Connecticut v. Menillo,"6 where the Court insisted
that its earlier "opinion recognized only [Roe's] right to an abortion,"
and "did not hold the Texas statutes unenforceable against a
nonphysician abortionist."
3. Aptheker v. Secretary of State
Aptheker v. Secretary of State5 involved a statute denying passports
to members of the Communist Party and communist front
organizations. 9 The Court invalidated the statute on the ground that it
applied to persons whether or not they were shown to have knowledge
that the organizations to which they belonged were attempting "to
establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship ... throughout the

world."" The constitutional interest vindicated here was the right to
travel, protected by the Fifth Amendment.9 ' However, the only two
claimants in the case were concededly "top-ranking leaders" of the
Communist Party, and the government argued that the statute should be
applied at least as to them.92 This argument was rejected, the Court
observing, in effect, that invalidation of a statute in its entirety had been
the practice in cases involving freedom of expression, and holding that
the same rule should be applied in the instant case "since freedom of
travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech
and association."'93 Thus, Aptheker is an offshoot of the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine. It has no general application.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 166.
423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam).
See id. at 10; see also supranote 27 and accompanying text.
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
See id. at 501-02, 502 n.2.
Id. at 510.
See id. at 507-08.
See id. at515.
Id. at 517.
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4. Romer v. Evans
In Romer v. Evans,94 the Court invalidated, as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause, an amendment to the Colorado constitution
forbidding, at all levels of state government, statutory provisions
singling persons out for protection on the basis of sexual preference.9
Dissenting in Romer, Justice Scalia observed that, in Bowers v.
Hardwick,96 the Court had upheld a state statute punishing homosexual
conduct. 97 It follows, he said, that a state is free to impose lesser
penalties on practicing homosexuals.9 s If, he argued, in this instance the
greater did not include the lesser-if, for example, the state was free to
discriminate against practicing homosexuals in regard to, say, housingthen the provision under attack was not unconstitutional in all
applications, and Salerno stood as a bar to facial invalidation."9
It is not clear that this conclusion followed from Bowers. It has long
been taken for granted that citizens of a state may seek greater protection
under the state's laws than they receive from the Federal Constitution. 0
Presumably, a state is free to refuse to expand the rights of its citizens in
this manner. It hardly follows that, consistently with the Equal
Protection Clause, the state can say, in effect, to a class of persons,
"Don't waste your time seeking such rights because you-and you
alone-can't have them." Arguably, the issue in Bowers was sufficiently
distinct to render that decision inapposite. Such reasoning was at least
implicit in the Romer majority opinion.
In sum, the proponents of an expanded view of facial invalidation
have not proffered a single decision showing a determination of the
Court to invalidate a statute in its valid components, unless Romer is
such a case. But Romer is far from a clear holding on this point, and it is
hardly a basis for attributing to the Court a basically new direction in
regard to the effect of facial invalidation on persons whose conduct is
punishable.

94. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
95. See id. at 623-24.
96. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
97. See id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188-89).
98. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On the other hand, if the state imposed
penalties on nonpracticing homosexuals (which he thought to be an insignificant class), he stated
that such persons were entitled to seek relief on an as-applied basis. See id. at 643 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
99. See id. at 641-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. See, e.g., Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "a state may
provide greater protections under its laws than the Constitution requires").
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C. Punishingthe Legislature
Total invalidation of a hybrid statute means that even its valid
provisions are struck down. As previously observed, just how the public
interest would be served by placing beyond the reach of the law persons
whose conduct is not constitutionally protected is a question not
considered by the proponents of total invalidation, who see total
invalidation as an unmitigated good in its supposed benefit to persons in
a position similar to that of the constitutionally protected plaintiff.'0 '
This Author can think of no reason why the Court should exempt
unprotected persons from the reach of the law other than as a slap on the
legislative wrist. And occasionally, in a different context, the Court has
indeed taken the position that the legislature should not escape
unscathed after adopting an unconstitutional statute. °e The legislature,
the Court has said, should not get off without "paying" for its
mistakes.' 3 The point was made summarily, if not casually. No
consideration seems to have been given to the pertinence of the principle
of separation of powers.
Consider that legislators are sworn to uphold the Constitution, 4
and that there is no a priori reason to believe that their understanding of
its requirements is inferior to that of judges. If the judiciary may punish
the legislature for the latter's perceived inattention to constitutional
requirements, it is not clear why the legislature may not punish the
judiciary for the same perceived offense.'05 Thus, one "wrong" decision
101. See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990) ("Legislators who know they can
cure their own mistakes ... without significant cost may not be as careful to avoid drafting
overbroad statutes as they might otherwise be."); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 586 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined on this point by four additional justices)
("If the promulgation of overbroad laws ... was cost free ...then legislatures would have
significantly reduced incentive to stay within constitutional bounds in the first place."); cf. Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 & nn.49-50 (1997) (stating that the Court "'will not rewrite a... law
to conform it to constitutional requirements"' because that would essentially "'substitute the judicial
for the legislative department"' and "derogate Congress' 'incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law
in the first place"' (citations omitted)).
For support of punishing the legislature, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 888 & n.221 (1991) [hereinafter Fallon, Overbreadth], and Fallon,
FacialChallenges,supra note 15, at 1352, 1354-55.
103. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 121. The term "punishment" is stark. It is sugar-coated by
calling it a "disincentive," see Fallon, FacialChallenges, supra note 15, at 1352, or a "deterrent,"
see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,471 (1976).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
105. To be sure, the judiciary sometimes punishes-or, as it says, deters-the executive, as in'
the case of the exclusionary rule. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 492 (noting that the "immediate effect of
[the exclusionary rule] will be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth
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could result in a temporary withdrawal of janitorial services; another,
thought to be especially egregious, could result in the eviction of the
Justices from their courthouse.
Finally, as this Author has argued before, account should be taken
of the sheer futility of attempting to keep the legislature in line by
insisting that it "pay" for its mistakes.' 6 Punishing the legislature for
careless drafting is likely to be no more effective than punishing inferior
courts (if that were feasible) for allowing constitutional error to creep
into their opinions. Further, if punishment of one governmental branch
by another is consistent with the principle of separation of powers, the
executive, no less than the legislature, might properly punish the
judiciary, and of course vice versa.
IV. THIRD-PARTY STANDING
In two classes of cases, the Court allows a person standing to assert
the constitutional rights of others. These are the jus tertii cases and the
First Amendment overbreadth cases. If the plaintiff is a person within
the constitutional reach of the pertinent statute, invalidation of the statute
may be total, in the sense that the statute is voided even in its application
to the plaintiff.'" This sometimes happens in the jus tertii cases. It is a
defining characteristic of the First Amendment cases.
Under the jus tertii doctrine, the claimant is permitted to assert the
constitutional rights of others in circumstances where relief for the
claimant is necessary to prevent frustration or dilution of the rights of
those others.' °8 Thus, an organization ordered to produce its membership
list has standing to assert the privacy rights of its members,' °9 and a
commercial seller of beer has standing to challenge a statute

Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it"). Arguably, there would be an
unconstitutional excess of "implementation" if, in the course of litigation properly before it, a court
should punish the mayor for not getting rid of the police commissioner, whom the court thinks
responsible for the police abuses. It is one thing to punish the executive for individual police
misconduct on the street. It is another thing to punish the executive because its higher echelons do
not, in the view of the judiciary, adequately protect constitutional rights. Even broad injunctive
relief, though not punitive, may be too much. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) (noting
that "the principles of equity ... militate heavily against the grant of an injunction except in the
most extraordinary circumstances").
106. See Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1063, 1073 (1997) [hereinafter Hill, FirstAmendment].
107. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,618 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. Er AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 152-53, 187-95 (4th ed. 1996).
109. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,458-59 (1958).
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discriminating against young male purchasers." As these cases
illustrate, the relationship between the entities involved is
characteristically a reciprocal one.' In any event, there is always some
kind of relationship; the claimant is never a complete stranger.
In Barrows v. Jackson, 2 the leading case in this class, a white
vendor had sold land to an African-American in breach of a covenant not
to sell to "persons not wholly of the white or Caucasian race."' 3 When
sued for damages by another party to the covenant, the vendor defended
on the ground that enforcement of the covenant would constitute
unconstitutional discrimination. But the person discriminated against
would have been the vendee." 4 The Court justified the standing of the
vendor to assert the constitutional rights of the vendee by stating that in
this "unique situation ... it would be difficult if not impossible for the
persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any
court.""' In other jus tertii cases, the Court has granted third-party
standing when otherwise there would be "some genuine obstacle" to
vindication of the constitutional rights of third persons,"6 or such rights
would be "'diluted or adversely affected.""' 7 Thus, subject to some
recent and dubious exceptions discussed below," 8 the Court has given
constitutional reasons to justify third-party standing in jus tertii cases.
In Craig v. Boren,"9 the beer seller benefited from total
invalidation. The statute outlawing his conduct was invalid only because
it entailed unconstitutional discrimination against youthful purchasers.'20
Barrows v. Jackson was not this type of case.
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which is applicable
when a statute impairs freedom of expression, permits a violator whose
own speech is unprotected to attack the statute for violating the

110. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-94 (1976).
111. See id. at 195 (noting that a prohibition on the buyer's right to buy would result in a
violation of the seller's right to sell); cf.Patterson,357 U.S. at 462 ("This Court has recognized the
vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.").
112. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
113. Id. at 251 (quoting petitioner's complaint).
114. See id.at254.
115. Id. at 257. But the Court also said that it was "only a rule of practice" that stood in the
way of according standing to the plaintiff. Id.
116. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116 (1976).
117. Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
481 (1965)).
118. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
119. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
120. Seeid.at210.
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constitutional rights of others.' The reason given by the Court in these
cases is that to leave the statute standing would chill the utterance of
protected speech. 22 The basis for the doctrine becomes stronger when it
is considered that, as the Author concluded in a recent study, persons
who engage in unprotected conduct are the ones typically charged under
such statutes; invalid statutory provisions would thus remain on the
books for a long time if they could be challenged only by persons able to
establish traditional standing." The Court has held that third-party
standing is not to be accorded unless the chilling effect of the statute is
substantial.'2 4 This is comparable to the jus tertii rule that the plaintiff is
granted standing to assert the constitutional rights of others only when
needed to prevent impairment of those rights.'25
It has been suggested that if a statute has a chilling effect on
constitutionally protected activity, that is itself a basis for invalidating
the statute in its entirety. 6 This is unwarranted. After all, chilling can be
eliminated by striking down the part of the statute that produces the
chilling. What is needed is a plaintiff to institute the action. When the
Court creates third-party standing, it is because traditional plaintiffs are
unavailable. 2 1 When the statute is voided, they become beneficiaries
because the statute is voided in toto.'
In some recent jus tertii cases, third-party standing was granted
even in the absence of constitutional detriment to the persons whose
rights the plaintiff was relying upon.'2 9 It is doubtful that these decisions
121. This exception is discussed in Hill, First Amendment, supra note 106, at 1064, and
Isserles, supra note 15, at 369 & n.37. See also Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482
U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
122. See Jewsfor Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574-75; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
123. See Hill, FirstAmendment, supra note 106, at 1074-75, 1075 n.43.
124. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) ("Application of the overbreadth
doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine.... employed by the Court sparingly and
only as a last resort.").
125. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
126. See Fallon, FacialChallenges, supra note 15, at 1352.
127. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,257 (1953).
128. This Author has previously contended that, in some situations, invalidation of the statute
as to the claimant may not really be necessary as an inducement to sue. See Hill, FirstAmendment,
supra note 106, at 1071-73. But the Supreme Court's invalidations in the First Amendment cases
seem to be total. See id. at 1072 & n.34.
129. See U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). In Triplett, the claimants were lawyers who argued that federal
regulations restricting fee arrangements with miners suffering black lung disease violated the due
process rights of the miners. See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720. There was no showing that denial of
third-party standing would have been prejudicial to the miners; indeed, the Court, on consideration
of the merits, found "affirmative indication[s] that attorneys willing to take black lung cases were in
adequate supply." Id. at 724. Standing was granted to the plaintiff lawyers on the basis of their own
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pay adequate heed to constitutional limitations on the scope of the
federal judicial power. 30 Finally, the constitutional issues governing
interests in the fee arrangements as well as their clients' "due process right to obtain legal
representation." Id. at 720-21. The Court relied on a single authority, Secretary of State v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-58 (1984). See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720. But the Court misread
Munson because, in that case, it had noted the problem of allowing third-party standing absent
constitutional detriment to others, and granted relief on the sole ground that, in its view, the case
was essentially one of First Amendment overbreadth. See Munson, 476 U.S. at 957-58 (noting that
"[flacial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant,
but for the benefit of society"). A short time before, in Caplin & Drysdale, the Court had allowed
third-party standing in a case, brought by a law firm, challenging a drug forfeiture statute as
depriving its convicted drug dealer client of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Caplin &
Dysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3 (holding that the law firm, as well as the client, had suffered the
requisite "injury-in-fact," although only the client's injury rose to the level of a constitutional
infringement).
It may be noted that several earlier cases taking a somewhat similar approach to the
standing issue are reported in Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277,
287-93,297-300 (1984). He contends that these cases recognize that Party A has a right to "interact"
with Party B on the basis of the constitutional rights of Party C. See id. at 299. Party A's right to
"interact "is said by Monaghan to be a "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause, see id.
at 305, but the basis on which this interest may be pursued in reliance on the constitutional rights of
others is not explained, and there is no semblance of such analysis in any of the cases he cites.
Monaghan says further that Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), marked "a fundamental
conceptual shift" Id. at 288. It is submitted that Barrows did more than that: It placed jus terti
doctrine upon a much-needed constitutional foundation that comes to terms with the problems of
justiciability raised by third-party standing. See infra note 139. The rule represented by the earlier
cases, whatever that may be, is obsolete.
130. In Caplin & Drysdale,the Court stated:
When a person or entity seeks standing to advance the constitutional rights of others,
we ask two questions: first, has the litigant suffered some injury-in-fact, adequate to
satisfy Article Il's case-or-controversy requirement; and second, do prudential
considerationswhich we have identified in our prior cases point to permitting the litigant
to advance the claim?
Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3 (emphasis added). Similar statements were made in other
jus tertii cases, such as Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976), and, if sound in that context,
should be sound in other cases of third-party standing as well.
Is it true that Article II requirements are satisfied once injury-in-fact is shown? If a
person who has made such a showing then requests rendition of an advisory opinion, the Court will
decline on the ground that such an opinion is not justiciable. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Similarly, there is no controversy before the
Court, and accordingly a lack of justiciability, when the plaintiff names a defendant against whom
no legal rights are asserted. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (per curiam)
(dismissing lawsuit because "[ilt does not assume the 'honest and actual antagonistic assertion of
rights' to be adjudicated-a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one
which we have held to be indispensable to the adjudication of constitutional questions by this
Court" (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892))). Does the
proceeding become a controversy when the plaintiff asserts the rights of an absent person?
Typically, or at least commonly, the owners of the rights being asserted in jus tertii cases are not
parties. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 254-55. As
nonparties, they would not be bound by the decision. See supranotes 28-30 and accompanying text
As to them the decision would be a nullity, and this can variously be rationalized as resting on a

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:647

third-party standing are also pertinent to the very different question of
judicial power to invalidate hybrid statutes in their entirety. The persons
who are subject to the valid provisions of such hybrid statutes are, more
or less invariably, nonparties whose legal interests are not justiciable (if
the foregoing analysis is sound). In this instance, there can be no
argument that judicial determination of those interests is proper on the
ground that it serves to prevent impairment of the constitutional rights of
others. In any event, the latest Supreme Court jus tertii decision

want of jurisdiction, or the rendering of an advisory opinion, or otherwise an exercise meaningless
by reason of nonjusticiability. Decision on such an issue does not come within the federal judicial
power because it is made at the instance of a third party, unless such third party has the authority to
bind the owner of the right. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 34(3) (1982). But standing of this
character is determined not by whether the third person will benefit from the decision, but rather
whether the third person can fairly represent the absent owner, as in suits in loco parentisor class
actions. See, e.g., id. §§ 35, 40. Absent that kind of standing, how can a court, consistently with
Article III, resolve a controversy on the basis of rights belonging to a nonparty?
The Court has, of course, been doing just that, but only when necessary to prevent
impairment of the constitutional rights of third persons (apart from the deviations described supra
note 125, which it is hard to believe will survive as new doctrine). If this represents judicial
lawmaking in the prudential mode, the justification given by the Court has been decidedly
nonprudential. The Court has consistently said that it is implementing constitutional rights. See
Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 (holding that the challenged Oklahoma statute "constitutes a denial of the
equal protection of the laws"); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 254 (holding that denial of the right to
"purchase, own, and enjoy property on the same terms as Caucasians" would deprive "nonCaucasians, unidentified but identifiable, of equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); see also supra note 125 and accompanying text. While the Court has
discretion on how to proceed with implementation, it has no discretion to withhold implementation.
An anomaly must be noticed. No matter how a decision is rationalized, it cannot defeat
the rights of persons neither present nor adequately represented. The decision in favor of a party,
when justified as protection for the constitutional rights of a nonparty, would be difficult to sustain
if the nonparty could not derive personal benefit from the decision. Yet it should be obvious that the
nonparty would not be bound if the decision were adverse to his or her interest. In short, the
question of whether such an issue is justiciable will not go away.
So we are left with the problem of federal judicial competence. If it is thought that Article
III cannot be construed as embracing third-party standing in the circumstances indicated, the
Court's practice can be rationalized as an accommodation between the requirements of Article Ill
and other requirements of the Constitution. In any event, if third-party standing cannot be justified
constitutionally, it cannot be justified at all.
If, in ajus tertii case, the owner of the constitutional right is actually a party, a decision
regarding that right becomes justiciable. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 462-63 (noting that forced disclosure of the NAACP membership list "is likely to affect
adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster
beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate"). But the question remains whether
plaintiffs not asserting rights personal to themselves can prevail in light of the Raines principle,
which the Court has said to be of constitutional dimension. See supra Part Il.C. Departure from
Raines should not be allowed without constitutional justification, which traditionalfjus tertii doctrine
has, of course, supplied.
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emphasized the constitutional
entitlement of the persons whose rights
3
were being asserted. 1
The Court's justification for third-party standing suggests the basis
for expanding the practice. In the course of a study of vagueness
doctrine, this Author concluded that vague statutes almost always give
adequate notice in some applications, and, further, that persons on notice
are typically hardcore violators and the ones most often proceeded
against. The result is that vague statutes remain on the books for a long
time, with a chilling effect on others, who only infrequently can make a
showing of traditional standing to complain of these statutes. 133 The
rights thus chilled may not be conferred by the First Amendment, but
uncertainty regarding the reach of the law is no small matter.
Another situation calling for expansion of invalidation in full is
suggested by Harper v. Virginia Board of ElectionsI 4 This case
involved a challenge to Virginia's poll tax.135 The plaintiffs contended
that they were impoverished and that the statute impaired their voting
rights. 36 The Court invalidated the statute, on the ground that it denied
equal protection of the laws to poor voters. The Court invalidated the
statute as written-in other words, facially. 37 Under traditional doctrine,
even if a court expressly said that the invalidation was facial, the statute
would be invalid only as to the plaintiffs, and under stare decisis as to
others similarly situated. 3 8 It would not be void as to voters who were
not poor. Yet, leaving the Virginia statute standing as to such people
would have introduced intolerable vagueness, affecting both the rich and
the poor in the absence of any line separating the two. This could be
avoided by judicial language making it clear that the statute was being
invalidated in all possible applications. Such language, even when
embodied in the judgment, would not "kill" the statute, but its stare
decisis effect would be clear. All courts would be bound to deny
enforcement of this statute or any statute like it.

131. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991) (stating that efforts by such persons to
vindicate those rights themselves would be "daunting").
132. See Hill, Police Discretion, supra note 20, at 1317-18 (comparing vagueness doctrine
with First Amendment overbreadth); cf. Ford, supra note 70, at 1451-52 (discussing reasons for
applying overbreadth doctrine in abortion cases).
133. Hill, Police Discretion,supra note 20, at 1317-18.
134. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
135. See id. at 664.
136. See id. at664n.l.
137. See id. at 666, 668-69.
138. See discussion supraPart II.F.
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At least superficially, the posited example bears no likeness to
either the jus tertii or First Amendment overbreadth doctrines. It does
not involve a constitutionally unprotected person relying on the
constitutional rights of others. Rather, it suggests that a court should
invalidate a statute in its entirety if leaving part of the statute standing
would create constitutional problems. Thus, in this instance, too, action
would be taken to prevent constitutional detriment to persons not before
the court. And this is the basic thrust of the jus tertii and First
Amendment overbreadth cases.
V.

ACADEMIC COMMENTATORS

The writers discussed in Part V have all been referred to in previous
parts, where relevant. Here, the discussion will be about prominent
features of their work that have not previously been addressed. As will
be shown, all of them believe that, without more, a statute comprised of
valid and invalid components is invalid in its entirety. But they also
recognize that, under the principle of United States v. Raines, the Court,
at least typically, enforces the valid components of such statutes. The
work of these writers consists in large part of attempts to rationalize this
discrepancy. The dominant figure in this group is Henry Monaghan,
upon whose views the others have built.
A.

Henry P. Monaghan

It is Monaghan, who in an influential article, has advanced the
thesis that a hybrid statute is unconstitutional in its entirety. 139 The valid
parts of such a statute, he maintains, can be saved only if separable from
the rest of the statute.' 40 Furthermore, he rejects the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine as unsound, arguing that the decisions rendered
understood as turning upon
pursuant to that doctrine can be better
4
nonseparability of the pertinent statutes.' '
1. Separability as a Constitutional Issue
Monaghan's starting point is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad
Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co. "4 In that case, the railroad complained of a
state statute that required settlement of claims for lost or damaged

139.
140.
141.
142.

See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
See id. at5.
Seeid. at30-31.
226 U.S. 217 (1912); see Monaghan, supranote 139, at 6.
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freight within a specified period. 43 The railroad argued that the statute,
in violation of due process, required the settlement of even frivolous
claims.'" But it was enough for the Court that the statute was valid as
applied to the railroad's conduct. The Court said:
[T]his court must deal with the case in hand and not with imaginary
ones. It suffices, therefore, to hold that, as applied to cases like the
present, the statute is valid. How the state court may apply it to other
cases, whether its general words may be treated as more or less
restrained, and how far parts of it may be sustained if others fail are
matters upon which we need not speculate now.141
Monaghan maintains that this decision is wrong and indeed
"unintelligible," unless seen as resting on a presumption that the valid
and invalid terms of the statute were separable.' 6 This rationalization,
now known as the "Yazoo presumption,"' 47 has been accepted as
fundamental by other scholars. 48 In this view, separability vel non is an
issue of constitutional dimension.' 49 This is a delusion. As previously
argued by this Author:
To be sure, one who violates a statute is entitled to exoneration
upon showing that (1) the statute is unconstitutional as to others, and
(2) the terms of the statute are not separable. But even if rejection of
such a defense is erroneous under the governing law, it does not follow
that the claimant has been denied a right derived from the Constitution.
Assume the argument is made in a state court that a statute of the state
violates the federal constitution in its application to third persons, and
also that its provisions are nonseparable. The claim of nonseparability
does not arise under the Constitution, but rather under the law of the
state. This is obvious when the statute contains an express separability
clause. In the absence of such a clause, the claim rests upon
143. See Yazoo, 226 U.S. at 218.
144. See id. at 219.
145. Id. at219-20.
146. See Monaghan, supranote 139, at 6-7, 7 n.26.
147. Id. at 12 n.49, 29. But see Doff, supra note 42, at 251 (calling it the "YazoolSalerno
Presumption"); Hill, FirstAmendment, supra note 106, at 1082 (noting that the Author did "not
see ... any talk of a presumption" in the Yazoo decision).
148. See Dorf, supra note 42, at 249-50; Fallon, Facial Challenges, supra note 15, at 1331;
Isserles, supranote 15, at 367-69.
149. Cf. Fallon, Overbreadth, supra note 102, at 874-75 ("[A] statute that proscribes any
constitutionally protected conduct is unconstitutional in its totality unless severable[.]"); see also id.
at 889 ("If overbreadth doctrine were limited to protecting the personal right not to be subjected to
sanctions under an unconstitutional rule of law, sanctions should be sustained even under overbroad
statutes so long as ...the statutes are severable ....This approach would virtually never require a
court... to invalidate a statute.., on grounds of overbreadth.").
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construction of the statute. If the state legislature intended
nonseparability, and the state court concludes otherwise, the court may
have failed in its duty to the legislature but has done nothing that
offends the federal constitution.
The same analysis should control when a claim is made, in a federal
court, that the provisions of a federal statute are nonseparable. If the
claim is not frivolous and timely raised, the federal court is bound to
consider it, but only in deference to congressional paramountcy on this
point. A claim that the federal court failed in its duty to Congress is
hardly enough to support an argument that the claimant's constitutional
rights were violated thereby; otherwise every adverse ruling on the
construction of a federal statute could be transmuted into a claim of
deprivation of a constitutional right. Similarly, state judicial "error" in
construing a state statute is not a ground for claiming violation even of
the state constitution. To assume that a statute that is unenforceable by
reason of 50nonseparability is necessarily unconstitutional is simply
fallacious.1

2. The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
Also influential has been Monaghan's criticism, in the same article,
of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.'5 ' The Court has said that
the doctrine does not apply when plaintiffs complain that the particular
statute violates their own rights, for "[t]here is then no want of a proper
party to challenge the statute.' ' 5 2 In that situation, the doctrine would
serve no function-there would be no need for an injunction restraining
enforcement of the statute until overbreadth is subsequently
eliminated. 53 The doctrine comes into play when the plaintiff has
violated a valid part of the statute and is permitted to challenge it on
150. Hill, First Amendment, supra note 106, at 1083-84 (footnotes omitted). As noted in the
text, Monaghan believes Yazoo to be "unintelligible" unless resting upon a presumption of
separability. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. His clinching argument is that "[i]f...
the
state court subsequently holds the statute inseparable, the initial application of the statute to the
railroad in Yazoo cannot be justified." Monaghan, supra note 139, at 7 n.26. But there is no
indication that a claim of nonseparability was made in the state court, or that that court intimated
any views on the subject. Even if the state court had held the statute to be separable in Yazoo and
held it to be nonseparable in a later case, that would not have rendered the second decision
unconstitutional. It is a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence that a court is free to change its
mind. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680, 681 n.8 (1930) (Brandeis,
J.) ("Since it is for the state courts to interpret and declare the law of the State, it is for them to
correct their errors and declare what the law has been as well as what it is."). However, the problem
of unfair surprise, at least in criminal cases, has to be guarded against.
151. See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 2-3.
152. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
153. See id.
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behalf of third persons, with a view to eliminating the chilling effect of
the statute on the exercise of First55 Amendment rights 4 That is the
doctrine as expounded by the Court.
Monaghan's explanation of the First Amendment cases is quite
different. According to him, the Court has simply been applying (and
sometimes misapplying) what he deems to be a traditional rule, to the
effect that hybrid statutes are invalid in their entirety.'56 He recognizes
that what he calls "the Yazoo separability presumption" prevents such a
result in the ordinary case.'57 But he says that there is "little scope" for
separability law to function in the case of a statute violative of the First
Amendment. 55 His explanation of this point is less than clear. 59 Despite
seemingly contradictory statements in successive paragraphs,'6 he seems
to believe that, when a hybrid statute is in part violative of the First
Amendment, there is "little scope" for a saving construction by
separation of the good and bad parts.' 61 Yet, it is exceedingly difficult to
find in his article any plausible reason why First Amendment statutes
should be treated differently in this regard, 162 apart from an enigmatic
suggestion that, as to such statutes, separability may not be feasible.'
154. See Isserles, supra note 15, at 369.
155. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) (plurality opinion); Brockett,
472 U.S. at 503-04.
156. See Monaghan, supranote 139, at 3-4, 12.
157. Seeid. at7,29.
158. See id. at 29. Monaghan believes the Court has been wrong in denying relief when the
chilling produced by the statute was not substantial. See id. at 27-28.
159. With reference to Monaghan's article as a whole, Fallon has stated that it is "cryptic" and
not easy to summarize. See Fallon, Facial Challenges, supra note 15, at 1353. Earlier, he had said
that Monaghan gave "no adequate account" of why First Amendment statutes should receive special
treatment. See Fallon, Overbreadth,supranote 102, at 872 & n. 115.
160. Monaghan states:
[W]hen a trespass statute is in fact applied to anything embraced within the
constitutional definition of speech, the contextually specific construction given to the
statute must be valid. If it is not, the statute is to that extent-and to that extent onlyinvalid as a matter of constitutional law.
The requirement of an acceptable, contextually specific construction ordinarily will
mean that the relevant constitutional principles must be sufficiently elaborated by the
state court to ensure that the statute's reach is sufficiently constrained. An elaboration
requirement leaves little scopefor applicationof the Yazoo separability "presumption"
inthe FirstAmendment context.
Monaghan, supra note 139, at 29 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
161. See id.
162. Monaghan's concern is that the defendant be tried under a constitutional rule. See id.
at 21. As he puts it, a statute must not be "facially defective.., at the time and in the terms in which
it is appliedto a litigant." Id. at 29. But this is achievable by separability.
163. This appears in his discussion of the least restrictive means test as applicable in First
Amendment adjudication. See id. at 24-25. He states that "the state court may not be in an
appropriate institutional position to truncate a statute to satisfy the least restrictive alternative
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The case on which Monaghan principally relies is one in which a
conviction had been set aside only for failure of the lower courts to
apply separability doctrine." The statute involved impaired First
Amendment rights, but the opinion leaves no room for doubt that the
conviction would have been upheld if the defendant had been charged
only under the valid part of the statute. 65
In any event, separability doctrine, which Monaghan sees as
determinative, is not of constitutional dimension, as has been shown by
the Yazoo-Raines practice.'6 The defendant has no ground for complaint
if punished for conduct in violation of the valid provision of a hybrid
statute, as long as the jury was instructed that it could convict only on
the basis of such conduct.' 67 The special treatment of First Amendment
cases has been amply explained by the Court.6'

analysis." Id. at 25. It is unclear what to make of this, since Monaghan also insists, properly, that
there are no federal constraints on the construction by state courts of their statutes. See id. at 16, 21.
How far a state may go in saving ("truncating") a state statute is entirely a matter of state law. See
id. at 21. Is the legislature really in a better position to fine-tune the statute, and, if so, what follows?
Is the judicial role precluded? Monaghan does not develop the point.
164. His reliance was on Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), which is a leading case in
its line. See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 10-11. In Terminiello, the claimant had been convicted
for violation of a disorderly conduct statute that, as construed by the state courts, outlawed protected
as well as unprotected speech. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 2-5. Whether the actual speech involved
in the case fell into the one class or the other was disputed at the trial. See id. at 3. The Supreme
Court held that determination of the character of the speech was unnecessary, since the jury had
been charged in terms of the statute as construed, and the jury had returned a general verdict of
guilty. See id. at 3-4. The Court said: "We need not consider whether as construed [the statute] is
defective in its entirety. As construed and applied it at least contains parts that are unconstitutional.
The verdict was a general one; and we do not know on this record but what it may rest on the
invalid clauses." Id. at 5.
It should be plain that, despite construction of the statute as embracing protected as well
as unprotected speech, if the jury had been charged that it could convict only on the basis of a
finding of unprotected speech (as explained to it by the trial judge), there would have been no
ground for reversal-assuming fair notice of what the statute forbade, which apparently did not
present a problem. The quoted language indicates that the court assumed application of the principle
enunciated in Yazoo and Raines to be as appropriate in a First Amendment case as in any other.
165. See id. at 5-6 (discussing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)).
166. See Hill, FirstAmendment, supra note 106, at 1083-84.
167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas ... is ...one of the chief
distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.
...
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute.., is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest.
Id. (citations omitted).
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B. Michael C. Dorf

In a 1994 article, Professor Doff maintains that facial (total)
invalidation is appropriate in all cases involving fundamental rights, of
which the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is but one example.'69
He does not say that the Court has announced such a rule, but he musters
cases which, in his view, show that such a rule is being followed.'
These cases do not support his thesis. In some of them, the Court did in
fact invalidate, without qualification, statutes apparently susceptible to
some valid applications.' But the opinions show no awareness of this,
or of the principle that permits litigants to assert only their own rights.
Further, Dorf is apparently unmindful in this connection of the rule that
limits the scope of a decision to issues considered and actually decided.
Another class of cases on which he relies involves prophylactic rules.'
These two classes of cases do not deal exclusively with the protection of
fundamental rights, and the opinions do not distinguish between
fundamental rights and other rights. 3 The case that comes closest to
supporting his position is Aptheker v. Secretary of State,'74 which was
discussed above and shown to be essentially a First Amendment
7
overbreadth case.*'
Like Monaghan, whom he cites extensively, Doff analyzes the issue

largely in terms of separability and presumptions.

6 In

principal part, his

article is an analysis of United States v. Salerno.'" In brief, Dorf
contends that Salerno's declaration to the effect that a statute susceptible
169. See Dorf,supra note 42, at 265, 271-74.
170. See id. at 266-67 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 636, 666 (1966)); id. at
272 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)); id. at 281-82, 282 n.212 (citing Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). Concerning these cases, see also supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., supraPart llI.B.2.
172. See Doff, supra note 42, at 275 (discussing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)); id. at 280 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988)); id. at 281-82 & 282 n.212
(citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928)). Concerning these cases, see also supranote 74
and accompanying text.
173. For example, Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189, and Wuchter, 276 U.S. at 15, both involved attacks
on service-of-process statutes. Doff also relied on Carey v. Population Services International,431
U.S. 678 (1977). See Doff, supranote 42, at 272 n.152. This case does not fall into either of the two
classes mentioned in the text, but neither does it indicate a special status for fundamental rights.
Carey involved a statute placing severe restrictions on distribution of contraceptives to juveniles.
See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681-82. The Court invalidated the statute after rejecting an argument that it
was amenable to some valid applications. See id. at 701-02.
174. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
175. See supra Part Ill.B.3.
176. See Doff, supra note 42, at 251.
177. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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to both valid and invalid applications is not facially invalid carries with
it the implication that such a statute is "facially valid. '7T Since this
would be intolerable, he insists that, if Salerno is sound, it must be read
as "establish[ing] an irrebuttable presumption that a statute's
unconstitutional applications are severable from its constitutional
ones."' 79 He then proceeds to demonstrate that such a presumption does
not make sense. But his argument is founded on a non sequitur.
Rejection of a facial challenge to an entire statute is not tantamount to a
holding that the entire statute is facially valid. Whatever the Court may
have had in mind in Salerno, part of a statute may be unconstitutional as
written or construed, and the Court has never held otherwise." And even
should it be clear that a court has purported to adjudge a statute to be
constitutional in its entirety, this would not insulate unconstitutional
parts from later invalidation
if the constitutionality of such parts was not
82
actually passed upon.
C. RichardH. Fallon,Jr.
Professor Fallon advances an overarching principle to explain the
facial invalidation of hybrid statutes, namely, that in almost all cases
involving such statutes, the challenged statute faces invalidation in its
entirety unless, presumably by construction, the terms of the statute are
"relatively fully specified."'8 3 In fuller text, he declares:
Doctrinally, it is clear that the Supreme Court sometimes finds that a
statute must be relatively fully specified at the point that a
constitutional test is applied, and that if the statute as so specified does
not survive the applicable test, it will be deemed unconstitutional on its
face.... [T]he clearest, best known example involves the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 2 4
If the statute is thus invalidated, he says, "otherwise valid subrules
cannot subsequently be separated from invalid ones."'85

178. See Dorf, supra note 42, at 239-40.
179. Id. at 238.
180. See id. at 240.
181. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
182. See supra Part I.A.
183. Fallon, FacialChallenges, supra note 15, at 1346. This phrase is also used in id. at 1342,
1347-48, 1351-52.
184. Id. at 1346-47; see also id. at 1348, 1353-54.
185. Id. at 1346; see also id. at 1348, 1352-54. Elsewhere in the same article, Fallon states that
whether this is indeed the law "is not wholly clear." Id. at 1341 n.109.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss3/2

32

Hill: Some Realism about Facial Invalidation of Statutes
2002]

FACIAL INVALIDATION OFSTATUTES

To take a minor point first, there is no warrant for the assertion that
later separation of good from bad provisions is forbidden. In the case of
Fallon's prime example of First Amendment overbreadth-where an
unprotected plaintiff is accorded standing to assert the rights of protected
persons -the Court's asserted purpose is to prevent enforcement of the
statute until the unconstitutional features of the statute are eliminated,
either by judicial or legislative action, after which the statute may be
applied even to past violators.i Fallon relies on an opinion in an earlier
case, which is distinguishable.' ss Indeed, the Supreme Court probably
lacks power to bar state courts from subsequent validation of state
59
statutes by construction."
While Fallon is not clear as to what he has in mind by the phrase
"relatively fully specified," his discussion of Raines provides a clue.' 90
Under the Raines practice, he says, the "meaning [of a statute] is ...
permitted to emerge on a case-by-case basis."' 9' However, this is not
permitted when "an applicable legal principle establishes that ... the
challenged statute must be relatively fully specified at the time of [the
statute's] application."'" This is uncommon usage, and its meaning is
not readily apparent. Fallon says that his "basic approach" is derived
generally from Monaghan, 93 who employed somewhat similar language
("contextually specific construction") in his explanation of the valid rule
requirement.'9 As best this Author can determine, Fallon means only
that, under Raines, the Court is unconcerned with possibly invalid
applications, while in other cases such applications are considered and
the statute is invalidated in its entirety, unless, through construction or
otherwise, it comes to the Court divested of its invalid features.
186. See id. at 1348.
187. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,494,503-04, 503 n.12 (1985);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-92 (1965). There is some contrary language in Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990), but there is no evidence that this has changed the basic thrust of
the decisions.
188. See Fallon, Overbreadth, supra note 102, at 853 n.3 (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1, 6 (1947)). The Court did indeed make such a statement in Petrillo and with special force,
since the Court was explaining why there should be hesitation before resort to facial invalidation.
See Petrillo,332 U.S. at 6. But the opinion by Justice Black failed to take account of the elemental
rule that facial invalidation has no effect beyond issues actually decided. Monaghan, discussing
Petrillo,was aware of its deficiency on this score, observing that "questions of issue preclusion will
arise." Monaghan, supra note 139, at 32 n.134.
189. See discussion supraPart 11.G.
190. See Fallon, FacialChallenges, supranote 15, at 1329-31.
191. Id. at 1346.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 1353.
194. See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 29.
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Apparently, in Fallon's terminology, the statute is "relatively fully
specified" when there has been such divestment.
Raines, he tells us, is the "norm," seldom to be departed from.9 As
to when departure is proper, he states that the requirement of "relatively
full specification" is a product of "particular constitutional tests
developed by the Supreme Court to enforce specific constitutional
provisions.3 96 But Fallon does not do much to elucidate this statement. It
is noteworthy that, except for the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, he cites no authority even remotely suggesting that the valid
portions of a hybrid statute are unenforceable.' 97
Fallon further states that facial invalidation "most commends itself
when a constitutional provision both affords protection to speech or
conduct that is especially prone to 'chill' and reflects a value that
legislatures may be unusually disposed to undervalue in the absence of a
significant judicially established disincentive."' 98 The "disincentive"
referred to at the end of this statement is threat of punishment,'" which
earlier in this Article this Author has concluded to be inappropriate.2 As
to the suggestion of facial invalidation for statutes that chill speech or
conduct, the Author would more fully agree if the prescription were for
third-party standing rather than facial invalidation, for reasons that have
been examined. 2°'
D. Matthew D. Adler
Adler maintains, on the basis of a lengthy and abstract analysis, that
questions of facial and as-applied invalidation are, or should be,

195. See Fallon, Facial Challenges,supra note 15, at 1352.
196. Id. at 1351.
197. In cases arising under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the Supreme Court
appears to assume that claimants go free, although their conduct is not constitutionally protected. It
is submitted that, in principle, this does not follow inexorably from the fact that the statute has been
invalidated on its face. When there is facial invalidation, others similarly situated can rest on the
stare decisis effect of the statute. But while the claimant in the First Amendment case seems to go
free, persons similarly situated are thereafter punishable, even for conduct antedating the facial
invalidation. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 n.7 (1965). Perhaps more plausibly, the
claimant's exoneration can be seen as resting on the need to provide someone with an incentive to
sue-just as an incentive is needed to provide a willing claimant in jus tertii cases.
198. Fallon, Facial Challenges,supra note 15, at 1352 (footnote omitted).
199. This is made clear by his citation at this point of Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 120-21
(1990). See Fallon, FacialChallenges,supra note 15, at 1352 n.160.
200. See discussion supra Part III.C.
201. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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governed largely by moral considerations.0 He states that "[e]very
constitutional claimant has one and the same type of legal right: a right
to secure the invalidation ... of a rule that goes morally awry." 3
Further, he rejects the notion of valid subrules. 4 He claims that, once it
is determined that a rule goes beyond valid bounds, "there is no further
question of the rule being largely, or only a little bit, wrong." 20 5 But
Adler concludes that it may be judicially expedient to "limit[] ...
intervention to the most serious cases of morally problematic rules." '
Fallon understandably takes Adler to mean that "[t]o stop serious
wrongdoers from escaping punishment under defective statutes ...
courts might sometimes be morally justified in imposing criminal
punishments under constitutionally invalid rules of law."
E. ConstitutionalTests
A number of commentators have said that the key to whether a
statute should be invalidated in its entirety is to be found in the specific
constitutional principle applicable in the particular case.23 They point to
the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as an example.2 Otherwise,
however, their suggestions of specific constitutional tests are unhelpful.
Thus, it is argued that, when a statute is infected with an
unconstitutional purpose, the entire statute is necessarily invalid.210 But
the unconstitutional purpose may not extend to all applications of the
statute, and, when this is so, the statute should survive as to valid
applications. This has been recognized by the Supreme Court. "
202. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
ConstitutionalLaw, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1, 12 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Rights Against Rules]. Adler
has said that his thesis is "too lengthy and complex for an easy summary." Matthew D. Adler,
Rights, Rules, and the Structure of ConstitutionalAdjudication: A Response to ProfessorFallon,
113 HARV.L. REV. 1371, 1396 (2000).
203. Adler, Rights Against Rules, supranote 202, at 159.
204. See id. at 157.
205. Id. at 157 n.542.
206. Id.
207. Fallon, FacialChallenges,supranote 15, at 1325.
208. See Dorf, supra note 42, at 251; Fallon, Facial Challenges, supranote 15, at 1327, 1344;
Isserles, supra note 15, at 423.
209. See Dorf, supranote 42, at 261-62; Fallon, FacialChallenges, supranote 15, at 1346-47;
Isserles, supra note 15, at 386-87.
210. See Dorf, supra note 42, at 279, 281 n.208 (asserting that "the invalid purpose pervades
all of the statute's applications"); cf. Fallon, Facial Challenges, supra note 15, at 1338 (noting that
one "bad. . . statutory subrule... typically will infect all others").
211. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion). Language
suggesting total invalidation should not be taken uncritically. For example, the Court used such
language in Hunter v. Undenvood, 471 U.S. 222, 230-31 (1985), but it disposed of the case by
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Similarly, a statute in violation of the equal protection clause may
be void as to all applications embraced by its provisions, but, then again,
it may not; 212 the Supreme Court has routinely invalidated parts of a
statute for denial of equal protection, while leaving the rest of the statute
standing. 3 It has been argued that underinclusiveness renders a statute
void in all applications, 214 but, again, the Supreme Court has not so
viewed the matter.2 5 Apart from the mistaken assertion that the
foregoing tests are pertinent as to when facial invalidation is in order, the
significance of facial invalidation as such has been overblown, as
previously argued. 6
The question of third-party standing is another matter. The specific
constitutional tests applicable in this area are similarly difficult to
ascertain, apart from the obvious pertinence of the First Amendment in
the overbreadth cases. 7 However, this Author has tried to show that the
doctrine governing these cases is part of a more general principle that
accords third-party standing to prevent impairment of constitutional
rights.21 The jus tertii cases also illustrate this general constitutional
principle. 2 9 Nobody seems to have suggested specific constitutional tests
to govern these cases, and that is just as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current controversy is largely driven by misconceptions about
the meaning and implication of facial invalidation. Traditionally, facial
invalidation meant simply that statutory language was struck down as
written. Further, the holding was understood to apply only to the rights
of the successful litigant. Minority justices and academic critics have
assumed that such a disposition confers no benefit, or insufficient
benefit, upon persons similarly situated. They have further assumed that,
when a court invalidates a statute on its face, it is striking down the
statute not just as applied to the litigant but also as to all persons within
its scope. But even if the court were to employ language making this
affirming the judgment below, see id. at 225, and it was obvious that the lower court had left
standing provisions untainted by an illicit purpose. See Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 621
(11 th Cir. 1984), aft'd, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
212. See Isserles, supra note 15, at 430-31.
213. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73-74,77 (1971).
214. See Dorf, supra note 42, at 251; Fallon, Facial Challenges,supra note 15, at 1345-46.
215. See Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 567 (1931).
216. See discussion supraPart III.A.
217. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
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explicit, nonparties would secure no rights greater than those conferred
by the traditional mode of as-applied adjudication. For as nonparties,
they would gain nothing from the judgment qua judgment. Their rights
would derive only from the stare decisis effect of the decision, which is
exactly what happens in the case of the traditional practice.
It has also been widely assumed that, when a statute is facially
invalidated, it is stricken down in its entirety, even if it contains valid as
well as invalid components. But when persons subject to the valid
components are absent, as seems invariably to be the case, they are not
affected by either the judgment or the stare decisis effect of the decision.
Were it otherwise, a serious constitutional problem would arise.
Much confusion would be avoided if it were recognized that courts
only adjudicate the rights of litigants, and are not in the business of
killing or mutilating statutes. Of course, the nature of the federal judicial
power is what the Supreme Court says it is. At present, however, it is
clear that, despite an unqualified holding that a statute is null and void,
the statute remains alive and well as to issues not actually passed upon,
at least in the case of nonparties. As to issues actually decided, the
statute may be technically alive but it is not well, since stare decisis
stands in the way of its enforcement220 The result is that attempts at
enforcement are effectively discouraged.
The confusion regarding facial invalidation should not carry over to
third-party standing. Here, persons who are not themselves
constitutionally protected derive benefit from the constitutional rights of
others, but only for the purpose of preventing constitutional detriment to
those others. To this end, and upon a proper showing, third-party
standing can be usefully expanded.
Academic commentators have been unhelpful because they have
started with the premise that a statute having both valid and invalid
components is invalid in its entirety-this in the face of repeated
holdings and declarations of the Supreme Court to the contrary. In an
attempt to reconcile this basic difference, they have erected theoretical
structures that are rickety and unsound.

220. The judgment, of course, protects the litigant.
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